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我们经常听到“律师是骗子”这类的评论。
第一：我不同意这样的评论，因为如果这个结论是真实的，美国就不会有公正。这和美国基本上是一个公正社会的事实是相违背的。
问题是，很多华裔找律师的时候，方法有问题。问题其一就是找便宜的律师。
下面的故事，就是这样一个例子。律师的中文名字是李晓升，英文名字James H. Li。（英文是律协起诉李晓升的原文。）
律协用了两个事件起诉李晓升。在第一个事件里，李晓升以4万元受理了一个案子，他保证成功代理王先生，如果不成功，他会把3万元还给王先生。王先生同意让李晓升代理他的案子。当李晓升把案子输了以后，拒绝把3万元还给王先生。在第二个事件里，李晓升开始以每小时$100代理崔先生，很快地把费用涨到每小时$650，榨干了崔先生。
第二：在美国是有正义的。
李晓升在很多年里，对华人胡作非为。他所有的招数，一开始都是以低价招揽客户。
凡事不是不报，只是时候未到。到了最后，加州律协正式起诉李晓升，为那些受害的客户伸张正义。
经验教训：找律师的时候，应该小心，否则，就会找到有问题的律师。如果一个人专门想找便宜的律师，那就会找到李晓升这样的律师。
几千年前，古罗马就有一句话，叫做“买者小心”（即Caveat emptor）。如果一个人找律师，一味找最便宜的，很难不找上那些“对症下药”的，诸如李晓升之流的律师。
下面是英文是加州律协正式起诉李晓升的起诉书原文：
1. James H. Li ("Respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in
the State of California on June 12, 1995, was a member at all times
pertinent to these charges, and is currently a member of the State Bar
of California.
2. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6106, by committing an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption, as follows:
3. On or about August 2, 2007, Ching Wang ("Wang") employed Respondent
to represent him in the case entitled Silvia Hu v. Ching Wang, San
Bernardino County Superior Court Case No. RCV090876 ("the Wang II
case"). On or about August 2, 2007, Respondent an( Wang entered into a
retainer agreement for a $2,000 "non-refundable retainer," and agreed
that he would be billed at an hourly rate of $100 per hour. Wang paid
the Respondent $2,000.
4. On or about August 5, 2007, Respondent proposed entering into an
amended retainer agreement, which amended the initial retainer
agreement. The amended retainer agreement required Wang to pay an
additional $10,000 as a "non-refundable retainer," and an additional
$30,000 in advanced fees. In the amended retainer agreement,
Respondent provided Wang with a "guarantee" that he would receive a
"favorable result" for Wang and the named defendants, which he defined
as: "(1) a judgment or verdict in favor of all defendants, (2) a
dismissal with or without prejudice of the case in favor of all
defendants, or (3) a resolution of the case in the way that Clients
choose to accept." Respondent guaranteed to refund the $30,000 in
advanced fees if he did not receive a favorable result for Wang and
the other named defendants. Wang and Respondent entered into the
amended retainer agreement and Wang paid Respondent the additional
$40,000.
5. On or about February 4, 2008, a judgment was entered in favor of
Sylvia Hu and against Wang in the Wang II case.
6. In or about February 2008, Wang demanded refund of the $30,000.
7. On or about February 6, 2008, Respondent sent an email to Wang
stating that his "guarantee" set forth in the amended retainer
agreement was "void" because Wang did not cooperate with him. Li did
not refund the $30,000 to Wang and Li’s claim that the retainer
agreement was "void" was untenable.
8. On or about February 13, 2008, Wang terminated Respondent.
Respondent continuec to refuse to refund the $30,000 to Wang and has
not refunded the $30,000 to date.
9. On or about January 7, 2009, Wang filed a lawsuit against
Respondent entitled Ching Wang, et al. v. James Hsiaosheng LL et al.,
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. KC054638 ("the fraud case") for
breach of contract, fraud and legal malpractice, among other theories.
Wang sought, among other things, damages and the imposition of a
constructive trust for the return of the $30,000. Respondent continued
to refuse to refund the $30,000 and has continued to refuse to refund
the $30,000 to date.
10. The court scheduled the fraud case for a jury trial which was set
to begin on May 4, 2011 and Respondent had notice of the trial date.
On or about May 4, 2011, Respondent appeared at the trial representing
himself and attorney Sally Chan ("Chan") appeared on behalf of Wang.
The court advised the parties the trial would begin the next day on
May 5, 2011, with a trial estimate of two-to-three weeks, and that a
jury panel of approximately 50 prospective urors would be present so
that the parties could begin picking a jury.
11. On or about May 5,2011, knowing the trial was to begin that same
morning, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case on his own behalf in the
case entitled In Re James Li, U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Central District)
Case No. 8:11-bk-16426. Respondent filed the bankruptcy proceeding
with the improper purpose of staying the fraud trial. The court did in
fact continue the trial in the fraud action, but issued an order to
show cause for June 26, 2011, as to why the trial should not go
forward, after Chan advised the court that Respondent had filed the
bankruptcy petition without any of the required schedules.
12. On or about May 16, 2011, and after having delayed the fraud
trial, Li dismissed his bankruptcy case.
13. By filing a bankruptcy case on May 5,2011 for the purpose of
delaying the fraud trial, and by maintaining the untenable legal
position that the guarantee in the amended retainer agreement he
drafted is now void as against Wang, and by refusing to refund the
$30,000 to Wang despite his written promise to do so, Respondent
committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.
14. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(g), by encouraging either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of
passion or interest, as follows:
15. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.
16. By filing a bankruptcy case on May 5, 2011 for the purpose of
delaying the fraud trial, Respondent encouraged either the
commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding from any
corrupt motive of passion or interest.
17. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(c), by failing to counsel or maintain such action,
proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him legal or just, as
follows:
18. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.
19. By filing a bankruptcy case on May 5, 2011 for the purpose of
delaying the fraud trial, Respondent failed to counsel or maintain
such action, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him legal or
just.
20. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(a), by failing to support the Constitution and laws of
the United States and of this state, as follows:
21. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.
22. Respondent violated 11 U.S.C, section 707(b) by filing his Chapter
7 bankruptcy for an improper purpose.
23. By violating 11 U.S.C, section 707(b) when he filed his Chapter 7
bankruptcy petitiol for the improper purpose of delaying the fraud
case, Respondent failed to support the Constitution and laws of the
United States and of this state.
24. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(d), by employing, for the purposes of maintaining the
causes confided in him, means which are inconsistent with truth, as
follows:
25. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.
26. On or about May 5, 2011, when he filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition, Respondent executed the required form, "Exhibit D-
Individual Debtor’s Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling
Requirement" to his Bankruptcy Petition under penalty of perjury
falsely representing that he had complied with the requirement within
180 days of filing bankruptcy. Specifically, Respondent checked box 2
on the form, which stated in pertinent part, "Within the 180 days
before the filing of my bankruptcy case, I received a briefing from a
credit counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or
bankruptcy administrator that outlined the opportunities for available
credit counseling and assisted me in performing a related budget
analysis, but I do not have a certificate from the agency describing
the services provided to me." Respondent executed the form under
penalty of perjury. Respondent knew at the time he executed the form
that he had not completed the credit counseling requirement prior to
filing his bankruptcy petition.
27. On or about May 5,2011, Respondentfalsely stated in his Chapter 7
bankruptcy penalty of perjury that he estimated his assets to be
"between $0 to $50,000," when he knew his estimated assets exceeded
$370,000.
28. By falsely representing on "Exhibit D- Individual Debtor’s
Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement" to his
bankruptcy petition that he had completed the requisite credit
counseling requirement prior to filing for bankruptcy when he knew he
had not done so, and by falsely estimating his assets exceeded
$370,000, Respondent employed, for the purposes of maintaining the
causes confided in him, means which are inconsistent with truth.
29. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-700(D)(2), by failing to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned, as follows:
30. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.
31. On or about October 17, 2011, the jury entered a verdict in the
fraud case in favor of Wang and against Li for fraud, breach of
contract, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, breach of fiduciary
duty and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The jury awarded damages against Respondent and in favor of
Wang for the entire $30,000
32. On or about January 5, 2012, the court entered an amended judgment
against Respondent in the fraud case for $44,000 in general damages
and $44,000 in punitive damages. To date, Respondent has not paid the
judgment.
33. By the express terms of his own "guarantee" contained in the
amended retainer agreement, Respondent has not earned at least $30,000
of the fees paid to him by Wang, and Respondent has owed Wang a refund
since on or about February 4, 2008, irrespective of the fraud judgment
and Wang should not have had to file suit or obtain a judgment against
Respondent to recover these unearned fees.
34. By failing to refund the $30,000 in unearned fees at any time
between February 4, 2008 and the present, Respondent failed to
promptly refund unearned fees.
35. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-100(A), by failing to deposit funds received for the benefit of a
client in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds
Account" or words of similar import, as follows:
36. The allegations of Count(s) One are incorporated by reference.
37. Respondent did not immediately deposit the $30,000 in funds into a
bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or
words of similar import after having been made aware in or about
February 2008 when he learned that Wang was disputing Respondent’s
retention of the $30,000 as attorney’s fe~s. Only on or about October
25,2011, and only after Respondent had been found liable to Wang for
breach of contract and fraud, did Respondent deposit the $30,000 into
his Bank of America client trust account no. xxxxx-x18911
38. By failing to deposit the $30,000 into his CTA at any time between
February 2008 and October 25, 2011, Respondent failed to deposit funds
received for the benefit of a client in a bank account labeled "Trust
Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import.
39. By failing to deposit the $30,000 in fees into a client trust
account at any time from February 4, 2008 when he learned Wang was
disputing his right to retain the funds as fees until October 25,
2011, Respondent failed to deposit disputed funds into a client trust
account.
40. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6106, by committing an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption, as follows: Only the last four digits of the
account are listed to protect the account.
41. On or about April 25, 2007, Michael Chui ("Chui") was sued by his
sister Cindy Tsui ("Tsui") in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No.
GC038906 ("the lawsuit") involving a dispute over the ownership of
real property located at 9333 Guess Street, in the City of Rosemead,
the County of Los Angeles and the State of California ("the real
property").
42. On or about August 27, 2007, Chui hired Respondent to defend him
in the lawsuit. Pursuant to the fee agreement, Respondent agreed to
charge Chui an hourly fee of $100 per hour. Chui selected Respondent
to represent him because of Respondent’s low fees and because
Respondent is fluent in Chinese (Cantonese), which is Chui’s primary
language. Respondent provided Chui with a written retainer agreement,
which Chui signed, which was in English and not in Chinese. The fee
agreement did not expressly reserve the right for Respondent to
increase his $100 hourly rate.
43. In or about January 2008, Respondent increased his hourly fee from
$100 per hour to $110 per hour for the first 30 hours of work during
2008, and then he increased his hourly fee to $250 per hour.
44. Between on or about August 24, 2007 and on or about September 23,
2008, Chui paid Respondent with cash, checks and credit cards totaling
$57,000, until he had no more money. At that time, Respondent knew
Chui was vulnerable and that he could not afford to retain new counsel
to represent him in the lawsuit.
45. In or about September 2008, Respondent, knowing Chui had an equity
ownership interest in the real property, approached Chui about signing
deeds of trust and promissory notes against his interest in the real
property as security for past due and future attorney’s fees owed to
Respondent.
46. Between on or about December 2, 2008 and on or about December 23,
2009, Respondent provided Chui with five deeds of trust and five
promissory notes permitting Respondent to acquire a security interest
again Chui’s portion of the real property in the amount of $170,000.
47. On or about December 2, 2008, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for
a $30,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was
signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not a copy
of the deed of trust in Chinese.
48. On or about December 4, 2008, Chui signed a promissory note for
the $30,000 deed of trust executed on or about December 2, 2008. The
promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 13% per annum on
the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate ofinteres! to
California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the rate of
interest to 10%. The r note, which Chui executed, was in English and
Respondent did not provide Chui with a written translation of the
promissory note in Chinese. The promissory note did contain the
following statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The undersigned
also acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to seek
independent counsel to review this document as well as the associated
DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has
been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to seek such counsel."
Chui did not sign any document in Chinese consenting in writing to the
transaction and he did not sign any document in Chinese acknowledging
that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to review the
promissory note and deed of trust.
49. On or about June 23, 2009, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for
a $30,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was
signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide
a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese. The deed of trust referenced a
corresponding promissory note dated June 2, 2009, but no such
promissory note exists.
50. In or about July 2009, unbeknownst to Chui, Respondent assigned
his rights to receive $50,000 from the deeds of trust against Chui’s
property to his sister Po Shan Li
51. On or about August 3, 2009, Chui signed a promissory note for
$301000, but the corresponding deed of trust is not identified in the
promissory note. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest
at 13% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a
usurious rate of interest pursuant to California Constitution, Article
XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note,
which Chui executed, was in English and Respondent did not provide
Chui with a written translation of the documents in Chinese. The
promissory note did contain the following statement in English, which
Chui initialed: "The undersigned also acknowledge(sic) that it (sic)
has been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document
as well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS
ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20
days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese
consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any
document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek
independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.
52. On or about September 8, 2009, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for
a $60,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was
signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide
a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.
53. On or about September 8, 2009, Chui signed a promissory note for
the $60,000 deed of trust executed on or about September 8, 2009. The
promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 17% per annum on
the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate of interesl
pursuant to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the
rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note, which Chui executed was
in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written
translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory note did
contain the followin~ statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The
undersigned also acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to
seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the
associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL
SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to
seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese
consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any
document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek
independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.
54. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a Deed of Trust with
Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent for
a $25,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which was
signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not provide
a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.
55. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a promissory note for
the $25,000 deed of trust executed on or about December 23, 2009. The
promissory note provided that Chui pay interest at 17% per annum on
the principal balance, which amounted to a usurious rate of interest
pursuant to California Constitution, Article XV § 1, which limits the
rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note, which Chui executed was
in English and Respondent did not provide Chui with a written
translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory note did
contain the following statement in English, which Chui initialed: "The
undersigned also acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has been advised to
seek independent counsel to review this document as well as the
associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS ADDITIONAL
SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20 days, to
seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese
consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any
document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek
independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.
56. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a second Deed of Trust
with Assignment of Rents as Additional Security in favor of Respondent
for a $25,000 interest in Chui’s property. The deed of trust, which
was signed by Chui, was written in English and Respondent did not
provide a copy of the deed of trust in Chinese.
57. On or about December 23, 2009, Chui signed a second promissory
note for the $25,000 second deed of trust executed on or about
December 23, 2009. The promissory note provided that Chui pay interest
at 17% per annum on the principal balance, which amounted to a
usurious rate of interest pursuant to California Constitution, Article
XV § 1, which limits the rate of interest to 10%. The promissory note,
which Chui executed was in English and Respondent did not provide Chui
with a written translation of the documents in Chinese. The promissory
note did contain the following statement in English, which Chui
initialed: "The undersigned alsc acknowledge (sic) that it (sic) has
been advised to seek independent counsel to review this document as
well as the associated DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AS
ADDITIONAL SECURITY, and has been given a reasonable opportunity, 20
days, to seek such counsel." Chui did not sign any document in Chinese
consenting in writing to the transaction and he did not sign any
document in Chinese acknowledging that he had been advised to seek
independent counsel to review the promissory note and deed of trust.
58. On or about March 14, 2010, Respondent commissioned an appraisal
on the real property, which was appraised as having a value of
$375,000. At all relevant times while he was billing Chui for legal
services during the pendency of the lawsuit, Respondent knew or should
have known that the value of the real property was approximately
$375,000, and that if the property was partitioned, Chui’s equity in
the real property would be no more than half, less any bills and
expenses to be paid.
59. In or about April 2010, unbeknownst to Chui, Respondent assigned
his rights to receive $90,000 from the deeds of trust against Chui’s
property to his sister Po Shan Li.
60. In or about June 2010, Respondent submitted a bill to Chui showing
a balance due of $156,974 and Respondent had increased his hourly
billing rate to $350 per hour.
61. In or about July 2010, Respondent notified Chui orally and in
writing that he was going to be charging him $650 per hour because the
amount secured by the five deeds of trust had been exhausted.
62. The trial in the lawsuit took place on or about August 3, 4, 5,
and 16, 2010.
63. On or about September 17, 2010, the court issued its Final
Statement of Decision ordering partition of the property by sale, and
made certain findings as to the distribution of the proceeds,
including a finding that, "All sums due to counsel for Chui to satisfy
the deed of trust in favor of James Li, chargeable to the share of
defendant Chui."
64. On or about September 17, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to
withdraw from representing Chui in the lawsuit, which was scheduled
for a hearing on October 12, 2012.
65. On or about September 20, 2010, Chui learned that Respondent had
assigned $140,000 of his rights in the deeds of trust to his sister,
Po Shan Li, and that Respondent would be representing both himself and
Po Shan Li in an effort to collect money from Chui’s equity interest
in the real property. Chui also learned that Respondent had filed a
motion to withdraw from representing him in the lawsuit.
66. On or about September 29, 2010, and while Respondent was still the
attorney of record for Chui, Respondent filed the motion to vacate
judgment as the attorney on behalf of himself and his sister Po Shan
Li. He listed himself and Po Shan Li as "Intervenors." On or about
September 29, 2010, and while he was still the attorney of record for
Chui, Respondent also filed a Notice of Pendency of Action for
Vacating Judgment (Lis Pendens) on the real property on behalf of
himself and Po Shan Li as "Aggrieved Persons."
67. On or about October 6, 2010, the court issued judgment in favor of
Tsui and against Chui and incorporated the Final Statement of Decision
as follows: the court ordered partition of the property by sale, and
made certain findings as to the distribution of the proceeds,
including a finding that, "All sums due to counsel for Chui to satisfy
the deed of trust in favor of James Li, chargeable to the share of
defendant Chui."
68. On or about October 18, 2010, after Chui secured new counsel,
George Young ("Young") and Steven Sugars ("Sugars"), Young and Sugars
sent a substitution of attorney to Respondent and directed him to sign
the substitution of attorney form and stop all work on behal of Chui.
69. In or about October 2010, Respondent submitted a bill to Chui
showing a balance due of $246,055.10 and Respondent had increased his
hourly billing rate to $650 per hour.
70. To date, Respondent has continued to attempt to collect his fees
from Chui’s equity interest in the real property and he has continued
to assert that he and Po Shan Li have deeds of trust for $170,000 as
against the real property.
71. By repeatedly increasing his hourly fees from $100 to $650 when he
knew his client had exhausted all of his funds in paying him $57,000
and had no means to hire other counsel, by securing five deeds of
trust totaling $170,000 against Chui’s equity interest in the real
property, and by increasing his hourly fee from $350 to $650 one month
before the trial date, Respondent committed an act involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.
72. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-200(A), by entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting
an unconscionable fee, as follows:
73. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.
74. The amount of the October 2010 bill showing a balance due of
$246,055.10, in addition to the $57,000 previously paid to Respondent
by Chui was disproportionate to the value of the services Respondent
provided to Chui.
75. Respondent’s level of sophistication, experience, reputation and
ability did not justify an hourly fee of $650.
76. Chui was a vulnerable client whose primary language is Chinese
(Cantonese).
77. If Respondent were to collect the $170,000 based on the promissory
notes and trust deeds he required Chui to sign, all of Chui’s equity
interest in the real property would be exhausted on Respondent’s fees,
which far exceed any equity interest Chui has in the property.
78. By charging Chui usurious rated of interest on each of the
promissory notes ranging from 13% to 17%, by advising Chui in July
2010 that he would be billing him at an hourly rate of $650, and by
sending his client a bill in or about October 2010 showing a balance
due of $246,055.10 after having already billed Chui $57,000 in a case
where Respondent knew or should have known the property was worth
approximately $375,000, Respondent entered into an agreement for,
charged, and collected an unconscionable fee.
79. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-200(A), by entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting
an illegal fee, as follows:
80. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.
81. By entering into the five promissory notes whereby Respondent
contracted to charge Chui between 13% and 17% interest in violation of
California’s usury law, Respondent entered into an agreement for,
charging, or collecting an illegal fee.
82. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-300, by knowingly acquiring a security adverse to a client without
complying with the requirements that the transaction or acquisition
and its terms were fair and reasonable to the client, that the
transaction or acquisition and its terms were fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should
reasonably have been understood by the client, that the client was
advised in writing that the client may seek the advice of an
independent lawyer of the client’s choice, that the client was given a
reasonable opportunity to seek that advice, and that th~ client
thereafter consented in writing to the terms of the transaction or
acquisition, as follows:
83. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.
84. When Respondent had Chui execute each of the five promissory notes
secured by the five deeds of trust, the transactions were not fair and
reasonable as Respondent was seeking a security interest in the real
property which was the subject of the litigation in which he was
defending Chui and Respondent sought to charge Chui usurious rates of
interest ranging from 13% to 17% for each of the promissory notes. The
transactions were also not fair and reasonable because Respondent
sought to use the five promissory notes secured by the five deeds of
trust to charge Chui an additional $170,000 in attorney’s fees, in
addition to the $57,000 in attorney’s fees he had previously charged
Chui, in a case where the subject real property to be partitioned was
only worth approximately $375,000, less any other debts, liabilities
or encumbrances. The five promissory notes secured by the five deeds
of trust enable Respondent and Po Shan Li to take all of Chui’s
remaining equity in the real property and to foreclose on the real
property.
85. When Respondent had Chui execute each of the five promissory notes
secured by the five deeds of trust, the transactions and its terms
were not fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a
manner which should reasonably have been understood by the client
because Respondent did not provide written translations of the five
deeds of trust and five promissory notes to Chui in Chinese.
86. Respondent did not advise Chui in writing in his primary language
of Chinese of his right to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of
his choice before he executed each of the deeds of trust and
promissory notes.
87. Chui did not consent in writing in Chinese to the terms each of
the five transactions a~ the time he executed each of the five deeds
of trust and five promissory notes. Chui did not sign any
acknowledgment in writing in Chinese of his right to seek the advice
of an independent lawyer before executing each of the deeds of trust
and promissory notes.
88. By entering into each of the five promissory notes secured by the
five deeds of trust with Chui without advising Chui in writing in his
primary language of Chinese that he may seek the advice of an
independent lawyer before signing the deeds of trust and promissory
notes, by not obtaining Chui’s written acknowledgement in Chinese of
his right to seek the advice of an independent lawyer before executing
the deeds of trust and promissory notes, and by failing to explain to
Chui that his execution of the five promissory notes and five deeds of
trust would permit Respondent foreclose on the real property or take
all of Chui’s equity in the real property which was the subject of the
litigation in which he was defending Chui, Respondent knowingly
acquired an interest adverse to a client without complying with the
requirements that the transaction or acquisition and its terms were
fair and reasonable to the client, that the transaction or acquisition
and its terms were fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which should reasonably have been understood by the
client, that the client was advised in writing that the client may
seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client’s choice, that
the client was given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice, and
that the client thereafter consented in writing to the terms of the
transaction or acquisition.
89. Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-310(C)(2), by accepting or continuing representation of more than
one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually
conflicted without the informed written consent of each client, as
follows:
90. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.
91. Chui, Respondent and Po Shan Li had competing and conflicting
interests in Chui’s equity interest in the real property.
92. By filing a motion to vacate the judgment on behalf of himself and
his sister Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for
Chui, by filing a lis pendens on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li
against the real property while he was still the attorney of record
for Chui, by continuing efforts to collect the $170,000 against Chui
on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of
record for Chui, and by continuing to represent Po Shan Li in efforts
to collect money from Chui, Respondent accepted or continued
representation of more than one client in a matter in which the
interests of the clients actually conflicted without the informed
written consent of each client.
93. Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(a), by failing to support the Constitution and laws of
the United States and of this state, as follows:
94. The allegations of Count(s) Eight are incorporated by reference.
95. Respondent owed a common law duty of loyalty to Chui while he was
his attorney of record in the lawsuit.
96. By breaching his common law duty of loyalty to Chui by filing a
motion to vacate the judgment on behalf of himself and his sister Po
Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, filing a
lis pendens on behalf of himself and Po Shan Li against the real
property while he was still the attorney of record for Chui, and
continuing efforts to collect the $170,000 against Chui on behalf of
himself and Po Shan Li while he was still the attorney of record for
Chui, and by continuing to represent Po Shan Li in efforts to collect
money from Chui Respondent failed to support the Constitution and laws
of the United States and of this state.
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